Donnellan: "Necessity and Criteria."
- Keith Donnellan's definition of analyticity is warmed-over Frege, Jerrold Katz says. Yet Donnellan's target here is Frege and Carnap.
Donnellan begins by questioning approaches such as Carnap's. Donnellan wonders: How can Carnap know if he is using the correct meaning postulates and
if they will work.
- Test case: "All whales are mammals."
First, would the applicability of the term apply to all possible cases? Answering this question in the affirmative is required to meet the condition of necessity.
Second, what if there is disagreement on the application of the term, as may be the case with applying mammal to whale.
- Donnellan's point: If there's a fact of the matter, the application must be made in advance. He doubts that it is fixed in advance.
- Donnellan's conclusion: The criteria of application cannot be determined in advance.
How do we know to what criteria to appeal to in such cases as disagreement between a sailor and a zoologist on whales as mammals?
Thus, is there some objective criterion that can determine the meaning of a term? No, Donnellan would say.
The argument from "Two Dogmas" supplies the "missing" argument
in the case for the inderminancy of translation. The argument
plays a role in the indeterminacy thesis because Quine's reason
for thinking that independent controls do not exist in
translation takes its force from the argument that there are no
linguistically neutral meanings. The absence of linguistically
neutral meanings is a prerequiste for the indeterminacy of